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Introduction
When the World Cup began in June of
1994, the Colombian national soccer team
seemed destined for international success.
The team’s impressive World Cup campaign put
Colombia front and center on the world stage,
gaining approval of international soccer crit-
ics and even the coveted blessing of the sport’s
greatest legend, Pelé. Led by defenseman and
captain Andrés Escobar, the team was expected
to rehabilitate the image of a country torn by
drug lords and rampant violence through their
inspiring play and imminent success. Unfortu-
nately, Colombia’s World Cup field of dreams
would prove more of a nightmare for the
nation’s international image.
The team was upset in its first match
against Romania 3–1, further adding pressure
to the Colombian squad to defeat the United
States and advance out of group play. Although
the United States had not won a World Cup
match since 1950, the pregame tensions for
both teams were enormous. Colombian coach
Francisco Maturana and his players began to
receive death threats from their war-torn home.
Forward Faustino Asprilla lamented, “This is
what was on our minds as we went on to the
pitch—that, if we didn’t win, there would be
trouble and we would be killed” (Ginn). Bur-
dened with fear, Colombia entered the match
against the United States lacking the confidence
that to date had helped them to rise to the top
of the international pool.
Despite several promising attacks by the
Colombian team at the beginning of the match,
the fate of the national team was changed for-
ever when U.S. midfielder John Harkes sent a
shot that ricocheted off of the foot of Andrés
Escobar and into the Colombian net. The U.S.
team went on to clinch a 2–1 victory, deeming
the game “the biggest win in the history of
United States soccer,” thereby thrusting U.S.
soccer onto the world stage (Howard). This
stunning victory over the pretournament
favorites sent Colombians into a violent frenzy
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that would make a lasting impression on the
sport.
At 3:30 A.M. on July 2, as Andrés Escobar
was leaving a nightclub on the outskirts of
Medellín, he was verbally attacked about the
own goal. After the verbal altercation, the
assailant then shot Escobar six times and imme-
diately fled from the scene. Although accounts
differ, many claim to have heard the attacker cry
out, “GOAL!” with every shot, mimicking the
sports commentator from the U.S. match. Esco-
bar was taken to the hospital and pronounced
dead on arrival (McCallum).
Soccer is a powerful sport that has direct
effects on culture, national identity, and eco-
nomics. It is a connecting point for people
across political, geographic, and socioeconomic
boundaries and a uniting force for both national
and global communities. An integral part of life
in Colombia, soccer is tied to the country’s
rich history, social evolution, and political res-
olution and has recently been utilized as a
tool for future development. Colombian soc-
cer has never reached a sustainable level of
excellence, however, due to events like the mur-
der of Andrés Escobar in 1994.
The path to becoming a successful soc-
cer nation requires planning, from grassroots
initiatives and education to the compilation
of a national squad that has the perfect mixture
of background, training, and talent. This arti-
cle explores whether Colombia has been invest-
ing in soccer in a way that is beneficial to the
advancement of national identity, cross-cultural
relations, and youth development. I first pro-
vide a base understanding of the sport’s struc-
ture and the bloody history haunting the
Colombian soccer programs before exploring
the efficiency of the grassroots initiatives and
professional soccer leagues. Through an inves-
tigation of the youth and professional pro-
grams, I evaluate the effectiveness of the cur-
rent systems and how they might be improved
to ensure a sustainable future for the success
of Colombian soccer, both nationally and inter-
nationally. It is important to understand that
successful sports programs are not simply eval-
uated on a win-loss basis. Financial stability,
community-based outputs, regulation, and ath-
letic talent will also be appraised to develop a
clear picture of the successes or failures of each
program.
Colombian Sports Structure
Colombian soccer can be viewed on three
distinct levels: grassroots or local programs, the
professional league, and the national teams.
Each level has characteristics unique to Colom-
bia and the Latin American sports franchising
system. Comprehension of the sport’s structure
is crucial to understanding the development
of soccer over time as well as how the public vio-
lence and financial failures of major soccer pro-
grams have had a direct impact on Colombian
culture and economics. 
Grassroots and youth development pro-
grams are growing increasingly popular in both
remote areas of Colombia and urban slums,
where children have limited access to education
and opportunity. International aid agencies, gov-
ernment initiatives, and in-country organiza-
tions have sent coaches and community organ-
izers to areas of extreme poverty or duress to
provide a creative outlet for struggling youth.
These programs are meant to promote sports-
manship, gender equality, heath, and education
as well as provide athletic training, all at a low
cost. Youth development programs not only
focus on children but also have concentra-
tions in community development, involving
families and local leaders to create a more
suitable environment for community growth
and advancement.
Colombia’s premier professional football
league is Categoría Primera A. This league
includes 18 teams and is regulated by the foot-
ball governing body, División Mayer del Fút-
bol Profesional Colombiano (DIMAYOR), and by
Coldeportes,1 the judicial board for all Colom-
bian sports. Play culminates in a championship
game, called Copa Colombia, at the end of the
season. Teams are distributed evenly through-
out the country, with larger cities hosting two
teams each.
Unlike American sports franchises, teams
are structured as clubs. Apart from holding sea-
son tickets, fans can purchase membership to
a club and have access to amenities, meeting
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1Coldeportes is the Departamento Administrativo 
del Deporte la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el
Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (Administrative Depart-
ment of Sport, Recreation, Physical Activity and the Use
of Free Time), initially created in 1968.
spaces, and social networks. Clubs have a pres-
ident and board of trustees who are responsi-
ble for managing finances, hiring coaches,
and recruiting players. Leadership is crucial
because teams are not guaranteed a spot in
the Primera A league. Teams placing last in
the Primera A league can be interchanged
with the champion of the Primera B league. This
sports structure is common across Latin Amer-
ica, although it promotes team association with
an economic class, political party, or ethnic
identity. This phenomenon tends to pit city, 
ethnic, and class identities against each other
and has been instrumental in the violent his-
tory in the Colombian professional league.
Violent tendencies continue onto the pitch, as
Colombian soccer stars, such as the retired Iván
Ramiro Córdoba, were infamous for collecting
up to 25 yellow cards, or personal fouls, per sea-
son (Miguel et al.). The more successful Euro-
pean clubs rarely draft Colombian professional
players due to a lack of international visibility
and the tendency for violent play. It is possi-
ble, however, for players to advance by first mov-
ing to the more prominent Argentinean or
Brazilian teams to train with some of Latin
America’s most talented players, before moving
on to a more competitive level of play.
The Colombian men’s and women’s
national teams are managed and regulated by
the Federación Colombiana de Fútbol (FCF)2
and Fédération Internationale de Football Asso-
ciation (FIFA).3 Similar to the United States,
players are selected from national pools to com-
pete at the international level at a variety of
age ranges. The national team must qualify
through a series of continental regulation
games to attend the FIFA World Cup, the world’s
most watched sporting event. Colombia has not
qualified for the event since 1998 but is cur-
rently working toward rehabilitating the image
of the program and hopes to qualify for the 2014
tournament in Rio de Janeiro. It is the national
teams that receive the most international press
and serve as the face for Colombian soccer on
the world stage.
The Evolution of Colombian 
Narco-Soccer
Soccer has been woven into the fabric of
Colombian history, serving as the national
pastime since 1903. British workers on the rail-
roads of Barranquilla first introduced the game,
and the sport quickly spread with the first
organized football club founded, Barranquilla
FBC, in 1909 (“Football”). It was not until
1924 that the first Colombian Football Feder-
ation, Liga de Fútbol, was formed and in 1936
that FIFA affiliation was first granted. A national
soccer league would not emerge until 1948.
Between 1948 and 1954 the Colombian soccer
scene was promising, as Argentinean players
populated the new league due to player strikes
in Argentina, which led to nicknaming the
era, El Dorado. Because of the successful early
years of football, Colombia became internation-
ally recognized for its playing style and young
talent (Museo . . .). In 1962, Colombia quali-
fied for its first FIFA World Cup but was elimi-
nated in the first round of group play. Despite
the 1962 World Cup defeat, Colombia’s Cate-
goría Primera A league began to flourish, dom-
inated by the Bogotá Millonarios team. Not until
the 1970s did challengers, such as Atlético
National, Deportivo Cali, Independiente Santa
Fe, and Atlético Junior, join Millonarios in its
success and become recognized on the world
stage.
In 1979, América de Cali established a new
regime in Colombian soccer, ushering in a
period dominated by violence and politics,
known as the era of narco-soccer. América de
Cali dominated the next decade of Categoría
Primera A play, backed by infamous Cali drug
cartel leaders, the Orejeula brothers (Museo . . .).
With cocaine exportation on the rise, drug
cartels began to rule throughout the nation,
profiting as much as U.S. $50 million a day from
sales in the U.S. market. These large profits 
were often legitimized through money launder-
ing, making soccer club ownership a popular
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2FCF is the organizing body for football in Colom-
bia that helps develop the sports culture through FIFA-
approved programs, supports the Primera A and B leagues,
selects national team members, and helps improve the 
quality of life in Colombia (Federación Colombiana de
Fútbol).
3FIFA is the governing body for international football
charged with protecting standards, encouraging competi-
tion, and promoting solidarity in the world game. Every four
years FIFA organizes the World Cup, a tournament that
brings together qualifying international squads to com-
pete in the world’s most watched sporting event (Fédéra-
tion Internationale de Football Association).
cleansing mechanism for the most profitable of
drug lords. With a large influx of money, the
country’s most popular professional teams
began to excel. Clubs could afford to hire inter-
national coaches and players, bringing a new
style to the game and fresh talent to the Colom-
bian soccer scene (Zimbalist). In order to make
the team more competitive, Gonzalo Rodríguez
Gacha, leader of the Bogotá drug cartels, pur-
chased the Millonarios club in 1982. Investi-
gations after Gacha’s murder in 1990 led to
the discovery of paperwork detailing illegal
player payments and money-laundering oper-
ations. His was not the only murder associ-
ated with soccer throughout the 1980s and
1990s. Attempts to purge the cartels from club
ownership also led to the murder of Colom-
bian Justice Minister Rodrigo Bonilla in 1984.
The murder of eight soccer officials in 1986 over
unfavorable, game-changing calls sent a mes-
sage of hostility to the international soccer com-
munity. Violence continued into 1988 when the
secretary of the Metropolitan Soccer League lost
his life over statements about the drug cartels.
It was not by chance that the rise of Colom-
bian soccer coincided with the popularity of
cocaine. The most successful years for the most
popular professional teams, Millonarios, Atlético
Nacional, and América de Cali, can be correlated
with the presence of the country’s most pow-
erful drug kingpins in each of the major cities.
Under control of the wealthy drug lords, these
teams dominated Primera A league play, clinch-
ing the championship titles and asserting their
power as a soccer dynasty (Zimbalist).
During this time, Colombia’s most noto-
rious drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar (no rela-
tion to Colombian defenseman Andrés Escobar),
involved himself in the direction of Atlético
Nacional, his favorite team from Medellín. It was
said that Escobar would kill to win a soccer
match and was suspected in the notorious mur-
der of referee Michael Ortega after an unfavor-
able call in November 1989. He was personally
invested in the development of the team and
its players. He used drug profits to benefit the
community, building soccer fields and provid-
ing equipment for the impoverished children in
Medellín. These fields later proved an excel-
lent recruitment resource, producing some of
the country’s most talented players (Ginn). Due
to Escobar’s commitment and sheer financial
resources, Atlético Nacional went on to be the
first Colombian winners of the Copa Liberta-
dores, the South American soccer champi-
onship, in 1989. His charity work did not,
however, save him from the threats of extradi-
tion to the United States. Escobar continued
to support the development of national soccer
in Colombia, until his murder in 1993. He
was buried with the flag of his team, Atlético
Nacional, and his death was mourned by mil-
lions of impoverished soccer fans nationwide
(Zimbalist).
It was the close involvement of the Colom-
bian drug cartels that helped write the history
of Colombian soccer, both with its international
successes and failures leading to bloody con-
sequences. The Colombian national soccer team
qualified for the World Cup in 1990, at the
peak of drug exportation and violence. It was not
until 1994, however, that the Colombian
national team earned international attention for
its startling rise through the FIFA ranks. Colom-
bia finally had acquired an exceptionally strong
collection of players and had the financial means
to keep them engaged. In the midst of extreme
guerrilla warfare, the Colombian national
team was the face of the country, responsible for
promoting a national image of peace and pros-
perity. The team needed to stand proud in a time
of national violence, playing harder to bring pos-
itive press coverage to Colombia. Connections
remained, however, with Pablo Escobar and
other drug kingpins who had helped the players
step out of poverty onto the world soccer stage.
During the 1994 World Cup, these relationships
proved dangerous as head coach Francisco Mat-
urana and midfielder Gabriel Gómez received
many death threats from drug kingpins and
national team owners via fax and telephone.
“There will be bombs in your house and in
Gomez’s house, if you put him on the field”
(Brooke). More threats had been extended to
players prior to the U.S. match, creating an aura
of panic and fear, throwing off the game of the
Colombian team from the norm. Seeded first,
the team lost in the first round of group play and
returned to Colombia defeated and targets for
numerous death threats. Escobar’s tragic death
brought a frenzy of media attention to the
broader violence and anarchy in Colombia,
forever tying soccer to drug trafficking. After
1994, the government purged the national
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soccer organizations of drug cartels, bringing
in new management and heavily regulating
sources of team funding. As a consequence, 14
of 18 Categoría Primera A teams were at risk
of becoming bankrupt and were not competitive
on the international level in 2010. The Colom-
bian national team’s world ranking fell from 4th
to 34th, as many players moved abroad or
resigned. Colombia has not qualified for a World
Cup since (Zimbalist). 
Youth Initiatives: Opportunity and
Reward
It was with great irony that, despite the
immense violence and tragedy connected to the
actions of drug king Pablo Escobar, his work
as a community activist provided a starting
point for grassroots initiatives in the world of
children’s athletics and education. Building hos-
pitals, churches, schools, and soccer fields in the
slums of Medellín, Escobar became a Robin
Hood figure for the poor and uneducated popu-
lation. Although he took interest in the impov-
erished so that he could later use them as pawns
in his drug trafficking practices, he set an
unlikely standard for community development
initiatives. His programs produced soccer play-
ers like Andrés Escobar, who went on to define
an era in Colombian soccer on an interna-
tional scale. He believed that soccer fields pro-
vided children without access to an education
the opportunity to develop a unique athletic skill
set, to experience community relationships, and
to at least momentarily break free from the
world of drugs and violence surrounding them
(Zimbalist). Although Escobar’s motives were
not purely altruistic, he believed in the power-
ful benefits of soccer for both children and the
community. Growing up in poverty, Escobar
understood the need for organized sport and
education and used his abundant resources to
create a standard for future work in community
development.
Youth grassroots soccer initiatives today
seek to provide benefits similar to those started
by Pablo Escobar and his fellow drug king-
pins. Programs currently present and working
in Colombia stand as models for social change
through organized sports and education in
the most impoverished areas of the country.
Children living in slums in major cities or
remote rural areas do not often have full access
to educational resources or authoritative figures
and role models. These communities are most
susceptible to the rule of the few remaining
drug cartels, as families and children have
limited means and are always looking for oppor-
tunities to climb the socioeconomic ladder.
Unlike Escobar’s work, current youth develop-
ment initiatives seek to use soccer as a tool to
keep young children in rural areas from being
drawn to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionar-
ias de Colombia (FARC), considered a terrorist
organization by the government, or to local
drug cartels. With almost 400,000 children lack-
ing access to a proper primary education nation-
wide, soccer can serve as a constructive edu-
cational tool for those in need (World Bank).
Although some programs are well organized,
others are informal, as teachers or govern-
ment officials bring the game to remote villages
with limited access to the more developed parts
of the country. These individuals often leave the
first impression of authority on the community
and its youth who have had little or no con-
tact or experience with government agencies.
Soccer in these ungoverned spaces provides a
creative outlet for children and complements
what little formal education they receive. Sports
encourage them to learn values, such as fair-
ness, health, hard work, and friendship (Cano). 
Formal nongovernmental organizations
promoting soccer for health, education, and
peace have become increasingly popular in
the more developed areas of Colombia. Under
the Soccer and Peace Network, 25,000 Colom-
bian children participate in a social development
initiative in which organized sport and activ-
ity can be used to improve life skills. The open
network of 17 not-for-profit organizations is
supported by the World Bank through the Japan
Social Development Fund (JSDF), the German
Agency for International Cooperation, and the
United Nations Development Programme. Since
2010, the organizations involved in the network
have been using soccer to promote coexistence,
reconciliation, and peace among children 
and community members (“Playing Soccer for
Peace . . .”). One of the most notable organiza-
tions is Fútbol con Corazón, a group based in
eight urban locations nationwide that focuses
on respect, honesty, tolerance, and solidarity
through organized play. The program not only
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includes professional trainers but also allows for
permanent monitoring and evaluation for all
participants, ages 5 to 16, living in extreme
poverty. Fútbol con Corazón uses a three-step
model for social intervention: (1) sports train-
ing that promotes healthy living, the develop-
ment of on-field skills, and abiding by the estab-
lished conventional rules of the game; (2) social
welfare programming, including workshops for
the development of life skills, school for parents,
and partnerships with certified educational
institutions; and (3) nutritional benefits, such
as lunches and afternoon snacks and dietary
monitoring by the staff. This model is used by
the organization in hopes of promoting positive
social change in the lives of youth and their
communities (Fútbol con Corazón). The JSDF
Colombia: Soccer Together campaign through
the World Bank was handled by Fútbol con
Corazón for the improvement of gender equal-
ity and inclusion in the local educational insti-
tutions and received $2.76 million of funding in
2011 (World Bank).
The model used by Fútbol con Corazón
and its counterpart organizations is the Foot-
ball for Peace methodology and is the princi-
pal reason for the overwhelming success of
these organizations. This methodology, estab-
lished in 2003, uses principles of coexistence
and physical exercise to promote values, such
as teamwork, gender equality, victory with
humility, defeat with dignity, tolerance, peace,
fair play, and respect for the body and mind. Soc-
cer is a tool to counteract the negative influ-
ences children are exposed to in the poverty-
stricken urban areas where they live. Physical
exercise and athletic training are used as a
base for lessons in fair play, respect, and gen-
der equality. Organizations, such as Tiempo
de Juego (translated, Playtime), also include
other creative and technologic opportunities for
participants. These opportunities are part of the
Generación de Oportunidades Laborales (GOL)
(Generational Careers) program offered through
Tiempo de Juego. GOL, in conjunction with a
variety of government-sponsored programs,
seeks to improve the socioeconomic situation
of the youth participants by providing training
programs and employment opportunities in
journalism, athletic training, dance, and sys-
tems engineering (Tiempo de Juego). The Foot-
ball for Peace system was recently adopted on
an international scale through the Golombiao
soccer tournament. Originating in Medellín in
1996, this tournament brings together about
200 children from around the country to take
part in a “Game of Peace.” Game advisors help
children collaborate and embrace themes of
civic participation, gender equality, and conflict
resolution. Rules echo these themes as no for-
mal referees are used, and the first goal of the
game must be scored by a girl in order to be
counted (“Golombiao”). In 2005, the tourna-
ment became an international event, and the
Football for Peace methodology has been
exported to countries around the world.
These programs, in Colombia and interna-
tionally, focus on building whole individuals
rather than just athletes and stress civic engage-
ment as well as personal health and fitness.
Although they may develop young athletes in
a way that could be beneficial to the growth and
success of the professional and national pro-
grams, the real success lies in the opportunities
provided for the children and the community at
large. As Soccer Without Borders co-chair Mary
McVeigh states:
What we seek as “outcomes” are growth,
inclusion, and personal success. Growth
means that the youth is moving posi-
tively toward adulthood, which requires
the development of character, respect,
identity and personal responsibility. Inclu-
sion means that youth who are often
excluded from opportunities gain the
social capital they need to integrate. Per-
sonal success means that youth can set
tangible goals that are relevant to them
and their dreams, and have the tools,
skills, and support to reach them
(McVeigh).
What do growth, inclusion, and personal suc-
cess mean for Colombia? A more positive out-
look for the future of at-risk youth, social inclu-
sion, and community growth may be just a
few of the benefits found by using soccer as a
development tool. The Football for Peace pro-
gram encourages children and coaches alike
to develop a strong sense of sportsmanship,
leadership, and personal identity through
unique rules and lessons on fair play. As the pop-
ularity of these grassroots soccer initiatives con-
tinues to grow, more children living in under-
developed areas will gain access to a broader
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range of educational opportunities. Whether
these programs could be as successful on a
national level is yet to be seen, because they
require a strong personal and individual rela-
tionship with the community.
Rehabilitation of the Professional
Soccer Scene
In response to the series of professional
soccer-related issues (discussed previously), the
Colombian legislature passed Law 181 in 1995
(Willis). Commonly referred to as the Sports
Law, it was the first attempt at regulatory leg-
islation aimed at making the operation of all
professional sports teams more transparent. The
law created the National Sport System, which
was to promote sports and recreation in Colom-
bia, along with Coldeportes. In addition it called
for the corporate restructuring of professional
sports clubs, along with minimum financial
standards and player labor requirements.
Although the rules for professional teams
were strict under Law 181, no sanctions were
put in place for clubs that did not comply with
the newly promulgated regulations (Uribe et al.).
Despite the efforts of the Colombian govern-
ment, professional soccer continued to be rid-
dled with drug cartel control, labor law viola-
tions, debt, license suspension, and default on
federal loans. DIMAYOR general secretary Rafael
Arias attributes these financial struggles to
the ending of the narco-soccer era. Previously
money was laundered through the soccer pro-
grams, and they were free to spend frivolously
and begin large projects, such as stadium con-
struction. When such funding dried up, teams
had to take on debt to maintain roster salaries
and continue operation. América de Cali, which
has floundered financially since being placed on
the Clinton List4 in 1995, owed players more
than ten months of back pay in May 2011 and
has had its license revoked by Coldeportes for
violating players’ labor rights. Government
statements show that the Deportivo Cali team
has defaulted on debt due to construction
expenditures for a new stadium that was to gen-
erate urban growth and revitalization. The Inde-
pendiente Santa Fe team was accused in 2010
of having ties to the Norte de Valle mob, one
of Colombia’s largest remaining cartels, and
laundering about U.S. $1.5 billion of illegal cash
(“Colombian Football”).
Because of these and other incidents, the
Colombian legislature subsequently passed Law
1445, or the Football Law, in May 2011, with
President and Independiente Santa Fe fan
Manuel Santos’ approval. Primarily the law
seeks to stop professional teams from being
funded by criminal activity. Under the Foot-
ball Law, no one “may hold control over more
than one club within the same sport, directly or
indirectly through a third person,” and the own-
ers must prove where funding comes from
(Barahona). Professional football teams must
follow one of two corporate structures and thus
be regulated by one of two government agen-
cies. A team can be structured as a nonprofit
organization, regulated by the Civil Code, or it
can be a corporation/stock company, regu-
lated by the Commerce Code. The Football
Law provides new standards for company profit,
voting power, minimum number of stockhold-
ers, and labor regulations for players. Teams are
now held financially responsible for player pay
by Coldeportes and can be subject to suspension
or withdrawal of recognition as a professional
sports organization for defaulting on this liabil-
ity. In addition to corporate restructuring, labor
regulation, and financial stipulations, the Foot-
ball Law makes professional soccer clubs
responsible for fan violence and substance abuse
within the stadiums (Uribe et al.). Barras
bravas, better known as football hooligans with
a tendency for violence and stadium vandalism,
can now be jailed up to ten years for the use
of explosives within the stadium. Law officials
are hoping that ticket sales, which have fallen
by almost half since 1991 due to extreme hooli-
gan violence and a decline in player quality
and team competitiveness, will increase with
enhanced security measures for fan safety
(“Colombian Football . . .”).
The price of a stable, competitive soccer
league is high, with the Colombian legislature
authorizing a government investment of more
than U.S. $53 million in sports infrastructure.
With the passing of Law 1445 also came the
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4The Clinton List, formally known as the list of Specif-
ically Designated Nationals, is a compilation of individu-
als or companies acting on behalf of targeted countries, ter-
rorists, or narco-trafficking groups. Groups on this list
generally have their assets frozen and are cut off from all
U.S. business interaction.
pledge to invest 20 percent of state publicity
funds to promote sports and culture within
Colombia. In addition, the implementation of
the Superate (Get Ahead) program will add
another U.S. $40 million to the growing govern-
ment investment, through the creation of a
more secure sports infrastructure and the offer-
ing of more than 300 sports scholarships to
talented youth nationwide (Barahona). The
Superate program provides incentives for at-risk
youth ages 7 to18 and municipal educational
institutions to participate in an exchange of
learning and athletics. Program objectives
include linking the National Sport System to
educational institutions in order to develop well-
rounded athletes and the creation of spaces that
allow for the discovery of athletic talent that can
be promoted to professional leagues. Partici-
pants in the program receive bonds exchange-
able for educational technology or sporting
equipment and outstanding athletes receive
scholarships and opportunities to perform on
a national level. It is the hope of program direc-
tors that more than 1,600,000 children and edu-
cators in 88 urban areas will be participants in
2014 (Superate).
With the influx of government funding,
the development of upcoming athletes, and
the newest regulations in place, will the Colom-
bian Primera A league change for the better?
Many believe that the Football Law is another
step in the right direction for cleaning up the
sport. Hopefully, the professional league will no
longer be a place associated with drug traf-
ficking, where the cartel with the most business
can decide the winner. Players will be paid
regularly, with the expectation that the finan-
cial stability will improve their home lives
and, therefore, their attention to the game.
Labor regulations for players should help the
league to avoid the unionization of athletes,
which could cause a massive overhaul of the
corporate structure held by most teams. Most
notable, however, is the sense of accountabil-
ity that is now shared by Coldeportes and the
team owners, presidents, and stockholders. Mil-
lonarios, one of Bogotá’s two soccer clubs, is
even considering relinquishing the two league
titles won while the team was controlled by drug
lord Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha in 1987 and 1988
(Willis). Since the establishment of the Football
Law, Millonarios is the only team to have made
such an offer, setting off a debate among own-
ers and managers about the moral obligation of
sports teams and the legality of the act. The
debate raises the question, “What will it take
to clear the scoreboard of Colombian profes-
sional soccer?” Colombian government officials
seem to think that returning the coveted titles
is a positive start, while rival owners call the ges-
ture absurd and refuse to follow suit. Although
it is noble of Millonarios to propose wiping away
titles won during the narco-trafficking era,
the talented players of that day should not be
discounted. The club still clinched the cham-
pionship title, defeating the highly skilled and
talented opponents it faced in 1987 and 1988.
Those who played in the years of drug cartel
control were the most talented players in South
America, helping to foster the most competitive
play since the years of El Dorado. Relinquishing
the title would imply that Millonarios intends
to discount the talent of the players whose
only fault lies in accepting a much-needed
paycheck from the country’s most notorious
drug cartels.
What the Football Law is not structured to
accommodate is the interesting, even positive,
effect of the narco-soccer era on the Colombian
professional league. “Remember that in the
1980s and 1990s, most people wavered between
desire and ethics. They wanted the team man-
agers to create winning teams by hiring famous
footballers, at the same time they ignored or hid
the disappointment they may have felt about the
participation of narco-trafficking money,” states
Colombian sociologist Fernando Morales (Mar-
tinez). With Colombian soccer organizations
receiving more than U.S. $40 million between
1985 and 1989 alone, teams were able to pur-
chase the most talented foreign players, rais-
ing the standard of the domestic league (Bara-
hona). Even teams like Atlético Nacional, based
in Medellín, which only signed domestic play-
ers, had the capability of paying for the best.
Drug money made Colombia competitive and
entertaining on a national level and helped
the country to develop its hybrid style of play.
New financial restrictions and more league reg-
ulation may stifle the growth of professional
clubs and limit their creativity in rebuilding the
once mighty empire that was Colombian pro-
fessional soccer. This regulation is necessary
to ensure the safety and well being of players,
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club owners, and fans. Although this may be a
step in the right direction for the rehabilitation
of Colombian soccer, the very need for the Foot-
ball Law nonetheless indicates the sport’s con-
tinued captivity to its bloody past. Transitioning
from a long history of violence and corruption
will be difficult, but it can be managed through
team accountability and an ownership of the
past by players, coaches, club owners, and
fans.
Overcoming Escobar: The Future
Development of Colombian Soccer
Soccer is the pastime of a nation plagued
by poverty, violence, and instability. It is an inte-
gral part of Colombian culture, becoming “an
arena in which social actors symbolize and
reproduce by means of their social practices the
values dominant in a given period” (Archetti and
Romero, p. 39). As narco-trafficking and vio-
lence diminish and Colombians strive to cre-
ate a more civil environment within which
the nation can thrive, the social practices and
values of soccer will further evolve as well. Soc-
cer becomes a model for social inclusion, as any
person regardless of gender, race, age, or socio-
economic status can play and follow the local,
professional, or national team. It becomes a
societal bonding agent, uniting the people in a
common cause. Fostering this sense of commu-
nity, soccer breaks down temporal boundaries
left behind by years of government neglect,
racial violence, and the iron rule of the FARC
and leaves in their place a rediscovered hope for
success and achievement. Whether a child in the
urban slums of Bogotá, one day hoping for a
chance to play soccer on the world stage, or a
resident of Cali cheering for América de Cali
in a Copa Colombia qualifying match, soccer
renews hope. It removes focus from the nega-
tive, if only for 90 minutes, and unites an
unlikely group of individuals.
Success also brings favorable press to
Colombia, which has struggled to present itself
in a positive light. Although the Colombian
national soccer team has failed to qualify for a
FIFA World Cup since 1998, the team is cur-
rently making great strides toward a bid for
the 2014 games. Qualification for an event of
this nature would not only bring together a
nation but also give Colombia the opportunity
to show the international soccer community
that it is capable of overcoming the tragic events
of 1994. Colombian soccer would be seen as
no longer defined by the two Escobars. A great
source of pride can be found in the ever-grow-
ing number of youth initiatives, new legislation
changing the way the professional league is run,
and the newfound success of the national pro-
gram. Soccer emulates the changes being made
on a national scale. As the country continues to
grow and mature, so will the game.
On the surface, soccer is nothing more
than a flat patch of grass, 22 players, two goals,
and one ball. It is nothing more than a hobby. A
soccer team, whether at the youth, national,
or international level, is not the same as a city
and most certainly is not the same as a country;
yet the purpose that soccer serves in Colom-
bia transcends the game itself. Soccer lies
deep within the spirit of the citizenry and acts
as a strong uniting force in the lives of all
Colombians. In order to create a sustainable
future for the sport, the nation must recog-
nize its past, look toward its future, and con-
tinue to foster a special sense of community that
can be found through soccer.
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